

nDPI Encrypted Traffic Analysis

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Who am I

- ntop founder (<http://www.ntop.org>): company that develops open-source network security and visibility tools including
 - ntopng: web-based traffic monitoring and security
 - nDPI: deep packet inspection toolkit
 - n2n: peer-to-peer VPN
- Intel Software Innovator
- Author of various open source software tools.
- Former member of nic.it



Monitoring Requirements

- Network administrators need to enforce network policies hence:
 - Limit the bandwidth of specific protocols (e.g. BitTorrent).
 - Block malicious communications that might travel over encrypted traffic channels.
 - Prioritise specific traffic protocols (e.g. WhatsApp/Skype) or cloud protocols.
 - Traffic decryption is not an option for many reasons, in particular as it is useless in many reason while violating privacy.

What Do We Want to Accomplish?

- Fingerprint network traffic to detect if both the protocol (e.g. the certificate) has changed or its behaviour.
- Prevent specific traffic flows (e.g. unsafe TLS communications) to happen on our network.
- Provide metrics for measuring the nature of specific communications (e.g. HTTPS) while not being able to inspect the content.
- Identify malware in network communications.

What is Deep Packet Inspection?

- Technique that inspects the packet payload.
- Computationally intensive with respect to simple packet header analysis.
- Concerns about privacy and confidentiality of inspected data.
- Encryption is becoming pervasive, thus challenging DPI techniques.
- No false positives unless statistical methods or IP range/flow analysis are used by DPI tools.

Welcome to nDPI

- In 2012 we decided to develop our own GNU LGPL DPI toolkit (based on a unmaintained project named OpenDPI) in order to build an open DPI layer for ntop and third-party applications (Wireshark, netfilter, ML tools...).
- Protocols supported exceed 240 and include:
 - P2P (Skype, BitTorrent)
 - Messaging (Viber, Whatsapp, Telegram, Facebook)
 - Multimedia (YouTube, Last.gm, iTunes)
 - Conferencing (Webex, CitrixOnLine)
 - Streaming (Zattoo, Icecast, Shoutcast, Netflix)
 - Business (VNC, RDP, Citrix, Webex)



What is a Protocol in nDPI? [1/2]

- Each protocol is identified as <major>.<minor> protocol. Example:
 - DNS.Facebook
 - QUIC.YouTube and **QUIC.YouTubeUpload**
- Caveat: Skype or Facebook are protocols in the nDPI world but not for IETF.
- The first question people ask when they have to evaluate a DPI toolkit is: how many protocol do you support? This is not the right question.

What is a Protocol in nDPI? [2/2]

- Today most protocols are HTTP/TLS-based.
- nDPI includes support for string-based protocols detection:
 - DNS query name
 - HTTP Host/Server header fields
 - TLS/QUIC SNI (Server Name Indication)
- Example: NetFlix detection

```
{ "netflix.com", NULL, "netflix" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },  
{ "nflxext.com", NULL, "nflxext" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },  
{ "nflximg.com", NULL, "nflximg" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },  
{ "nflximg.net", NULL, "nflximg" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },  
{ "nflxvideo.net", NULL, "nflxvideo" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },  
{ "nflxso.net", NULL, "nflxso" TLD, "NetFlix", NDPI_PROTOCOL_NETFLIX, NDPI_PROTOCOL_CATEGORY_STREAMING, NDPI_PROTOCOL_FUN },
```

Traffic Classification Lifecycle

- Based on traffic type (e.g. UDP traffic) dissectors are applied sequentially starting with the one that will most likely match the flow (e.g. for TCP/80 the HTTP dissector is tried first).
- Each flow maintains the state for non-matching dissectors in order to skip them in future iterations.
- Analysis lasts until a match is found or after too many attempts (8 packets is the upper-bound in our experience).

nDPI: Packet Processing Performance

nDPI Memory statistics:

nDPI Memory (once):	203.62 KB
Flow Memory (per flow):	2.01 KB
Actual Memory:	95.60 MB
Peak Memory:	95.60 MB
Setup Time:	1001 msec
Packet Processing Time:	813 msec

Traffic statistics:

Ethernet bytes:	1090890957	(includes ethernet CRC/IFC/trailer)
Discarded bytes:	247801	
IP packets:	1482145	of 1483237 packets total
IP bytes:	1055319477	(avg pkt size 711 bytes)
Unique flows:	36703	
TCP Packets:	1338624	
UDP Packets:	143521	
VLAN Packets:	0	
MPLS Packets:	0	
PPPoE Packets:	0	
Fragmented Packets:	1092	
Max Packet size:	1480	
Packet Len < 64:	590730	
Packet Len 64-128:	67824	
Packet Len 128-256:	66380	
Packet Len 256-1024:	157623	
Packet Len 1024-1500:	599588	
Packet Len > 1500:	0	
nDPI throughput:	1.82 M pps / 9.99 Gb/sec	←
Analysis begin:	04/Aug/2010 04:15:23	
Analysis end:	04/Aug/2010 18:31:30	
Traffic throughput:	28.85 pps / 165.91 Kb/sec	
Traffic duration:	51367.223 sec	
Guessed flow protos:	0	

Single Core (E3 1241v3)

Behaviour and Fingerprinting

- nDPI is not only about application recognition but also:
 - Traffic classification: is this TLS connection a HTTPS connection, a VPN, or something else?
 - Malware recognition: traffic bins (time and packet size)
 - Content enforcement: bytes entropy (measure how bytes are distributed)

Server Entropy (SCP)

PDF	PNG	TEXT
6,418	7,014	7,008

nDPI Encrypted Traffic Analysis

- \$./example/ndpiReader -J -i ./tests/pcap/instagram.pcap -v 2 -f "port 49355"

Behaviour

```
TCP 192.168.2.17:49355 <-> 31.13.86.52:443 [byte_dist_mean:  
125.398474] [byte_dist_std: 67.665465] [entropy: 0.997011]  
[total_entropy: 5609.185931] [score: 1.0000] [proto: 91.211/  
TLS.Instagram] [cat: SocialNetwork/6] [456 pkts/33086 bytes <->  
910 pkts/1277296 bytes] [Goodput ratio: 9.0/95.3] [14.29 sec]  
[ALPN: http/1.1] [TLS Supported Versions: TLSv1.3;TLSv1.3  
(Fizz)] [bytes ratio: -0.950 (Download)] [IAT c2s/s2c min/avg/  
max/stddev: 0/0 37.7/0.7 10107/274 546.6/11.8] [Pkt Len c2s/s2c  
min/avg/max/stddev: 66/66 72.6/1403.6 657/1454 57.2/231.0]  
[TLSv1.3 (Fizz)] [Client: scontent-mxp1-1.cdninstagram.com]  
[JA3C: 7a29c223fb122ec64d10f0a159e07996] [JA3S:  
f4febc55ea12b31ae17cfb7e614afda8] [Cipher:  
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256]
```

Fingerprint



Malware Analysis: Trickbot [1/2]

- See <https://unit42.paloaltonetworks.com/wireshark-tutorial-examining-trickbot-infections/>
- ndpiReader -J -v2 -i 2019-09-25-Trickbot-gtag-onel9-infection-traffic.pcap
- Many TLS flows on non-standard ports, self-signed certificate, same JA3

```
TCP 10.9.25.101:49184 <-> 187.58.56.26:449 [byte_dist_mean: 124.148883] [byte_dist_std: 58.169660]
[entropy: 5.892724] [total_entropy: 7124.302784] [score: 0.9973] [proto: 91/TLS] [cat: Web/5] [97 pkts/36053
bytes <-> 159 pkts/149429 bytes] [Goodput ratio: 85/94] [111.31 sec] [bytes ratio: -0.611 (Download)] [IAT
c2s/s2c min/avg/max/stddev: 0/0 1129/662 19127/19233 2990/2294] [Pkt Len c2s/s2c min/avg/max/stddev:
54/54 372/940 1514/1514 530/631] [Risk: ** Self-signed Certificate **** Obsolete TLS version (< 1.1) **]
[TLSv1] [JA3S: 623de93db17d313345d7ea481e7443cf] [Issuer: C=AU, ST=Some-State, O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]
[Subject: C=AU, ST=Some-State, O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd] [Certificate SHA-1: DD:EB:4A:36:6A:2B:50:DA:
5F:B5:DB:07:55:9A:92:B0:A3:52:5C:AD] [Validity: 2019-07-23 10:32:39 – 2020-07-22 10:32:39] [Cipher:
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA]
```

```
TCP 10.9.25.101:49165 <-> 144.91.69.195:80 [byte_dist_mean: 95.694525] [byte_dist_std: 25.418150]
[entropy: 0.000000] [total_entropy: 0.000000] [score: 0.9943] [proto: 7/HTTP] [cat: Web/5] [203 pkts/11127
bytes <-> 500 pkts/706336 bytes] [Goodput ratio: 1/96] [5.18 sec] [Host: 144.91.69.195] [bytes ratio: -0.969
(Download)] [IAT c2s/s2c min/avg/max/stddev: 0/0 23/9 319/365 49/37] [Pkt Len c2s/s2c min/avg/max/stddev:
54/54 55/1413 207/1514 11/134] [URL: 144.91.69.195/solar.php] [StatusCode: 200] [ContentType: application/
octet-stream] [UserAgent: pwttyEKzNtGatwnJjmCcBLb0veCVpc] [Risk: ** Binary application transfer **] [PLAIN
TEXT (GET /solar.php HTTP/1.1)]
```



Malware Analysis: Trickbot [2/2]

- Same packet sequence, same packet len and time distribution (using bins to detect similarities), same entropy...



<https://github.com/ntop/nDPI>

